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Abstract
In this paper we study the role of incomplete ex ante contracts for ex post trade. Previous
experimental evidence indicates that a contract provides a reference point for entitlements
when the terms are negotiated in a competitive market. We show that this finding no longer
holds when the terms are determined in a non-competitive way. Our results imply that the
presence of a “fundamental transformation” (i.e., the transition from a competitive market to
a bilateral relationship) is important for a contract to become a reference point. To the best of
our knowledge this behavioral aspect of the fundamental transformation has not been shown
before. (JEL: C91, D03, D23)
1. Introduction
In a recent theoretical paper Hart and Moore (2008, henceforth HM) put forward
the behavioral hypothesis that incomplete ex ante contracts provide reference
points for entitlements in ex post trade. In their model the trading partners meet
on a competitive market before they move into a bilateral relationship. Because
there is uncertainty about the state of nature, they write an incomplete contract.
As time passes, the uncertainty is resolved and the parties observe the state.
However, in contrast to most of the existing literature, HM do not assume that
trade becomes fully contractible ex post. They suppose that the trading parties
always have the possibility to provide perfunctory performance instead of con-
summate performance, an assumption that also plays a key role in the literature
on gift exchange (Akerlof 1982; Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 1993). HM refer
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to this as “shading.” In order to determine the conditions under which shading
occurs, HM introduce behavioral elements. Specifically, they deviate from the
gift exchange literature by assuming that the ex ante contract provides a refer-
ence point relative to which the parties evaluate the ex post outcome. The idea
is that each party feels entitled to his most preferred outcome permitted by the
contract. If a party is not getting what he feels entitled to, he is aggrieved and
shades.
HM argue that the move from an ex ante competitive market to an ex post bilat-
eral setting—what Williamson (1985) terms the “fundamental transformation”—
provides a rationale for the idea that contracts are reference points.1 A competitive
ex ante market adds objectivity to the terms of the contract because the market
defines what each party brings to the relationship. HM assume that the parties
perceive a competitive outcome as justified and accept it as a salient reference
point.2
The assumption that contracts provide reference points for entitlements
implies an interesting trade-off between contractual rigidity and flexibility. Flex-
ible contracts allow the trading parties to adjust the terms of the contract to the
realized state of nature. However, although parties accept the contract as a ref-
erence point and do not feel entitled to outcomes outside the contract, they may
prefer different outcomes within a contract. Accordingly, the multiplicity of out-
comes in flexible contracts makes it likely that at least one party is disappointed
and engages in shading. The parties can circumvent shading by writing rigid
contracts which pin down the outcome from the outset. If only one outcome is
possible, everybody knows exactly what to expect and there is no reason for dis-
appointment and shading. But rigid contracts have the disadvantage that they do
not allow the parties to adjust the terms. As a consequence, rigid contracts may
not allow for trade in all states of nature.
HM demonstrate that this trade-off between rigidity and flexibility has
important implications for the internal organization of firms. Their theory pro-
vides an explanation for the existence of long-term contracts in the absence of
relationship specific investments and sheds new light on the roles of the employ-
ment relationship and authority. In a follow-up paper Hart (2009) reintroduces
assets into the model and produces results which are in line with previously
hard to explain observations in the empirical literature on contracting and
integration.
1. In the HM model it is not crucial why the fundamental transformation occurs. Potential candidates
to explain the fundamental transformation are relationship specific investments or ex post search costs
for alternative partners. For more details see HM.
2. To emphasize again, this differs from gift exchange approaches which focus on explaining the
existence of non-competitive rents. In contrast, HM focus on the consequences of competitively
determined contract terms for subsequent behavior after the fundamental transformation.
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Although the implications of the HM theory are appealing, it is important
to identify whether the strong behavioral assumptions on which the model relies
are empirically justified. In a broad sense the forces described in HM are related
to existing concepts in the behavioral literature like reference-dependent prefer-
ences, the self-serving bias, or reciprocity, but until recently there was no data set
or experiment which provided a direct empirical basis for their ideas. In order to
close this gap, Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder (2008, henceforth FHZ) have conducted an
experiment in which they implement a simplified version of the HM environment
in the laboratory. Their evidence supports the view that a contract concluded in a
competitive ex ante market defines a reference point for bilateralized ex post trade
and confirms the empirical relevance of the trade-off between contractual rigidity
and flexibility. However, although the evidence of FHZ corroborates crucial ele-
ments of the HM model, their experiment does not vary competition in the ex ante
market. Accordingly, FHZ cannot identify the role of the fundamental transforma-
tion for their results. In this paper we run a new variant of their experiment, which
allows us to study the role of ex ante competition for contractual reference points.
This is useful because applying the HM model to different economic settings
requires knowledge about the conditions under which their framework applies.
Our new data show that the presence of the fundamental transformation is
significant for contractual reference points. FHZ confirm that rigid contracts help
to avoid shading when the terms are determined in a competitive process before
the parties engage in bilateral trade, and our new experiment reveals that, at least in
a laboratory setting, the difference in shading between flexible and rigid contracts
vanishes when the terms are determined in a non-competitive way. This suggests
that in the absence of the fundamental transformation sellers no longer perceive
the contracts as salient reference points. As a consequence, the trade-off between
contractual rigidity and flexibility disappears.
Our findings suggest that when applying the HM model to different setups,
it is important to recognize that the role of a contract for a trading relationship
depends not only on the terms of the contract, but also on the competitiveness of
the environment in which it was concluded.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we review the previous evi-
dence of FHZ in more detail. In Section 3 we describe our experimental design.
Section 4 presents our results and relates them to the evidence in FHZ. Section 5
concludes.
2. Review of FHZ: Evidence on Contracts as Reference Points
Because our current experiment is based on a modification of the design imple-
mented by FHZ, their results serve as a benchmark for our new findings. It is
therefore useful to review their paper in a bit more detail.
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To make the experiment understandable for the participants, FHZ implement
a simplified version of the basic HM model in the laboratory.3 Their design enables
them to investigate the empirical relevance of the central behavioral aspects of
the HM theory. In their experiment buyers and sellers meet when there is still
uncertainty about the state of nature and they conclude an incomplete contract
under competitive conditions. A buyer initiates trade by choosing between a rigid
and a flexible contract. Rigid contracts are characterized by a fixed price, but
flexible contracts allow for a price range out of which the buyer can pick a price
after the uncertainty about the state of nature (i.e., whether the seller has low or
high production cost) has been resolved. The buyer can choose only the type of
the contract, but not its terms. The terms are set in a competitive auction between
the sellers. In rigid contracts the auction directly determines the fixed price. In
flexible contracts the auction defines the lower bound of the price range, and the
upper bound is exogenously fixed. After the auction has assigned a seller to a
contract, the trading parties face a situation of bilateral monopoly and move to
the trading stage.
Before the parties have the opportunity to trade, a random device determines
the state of nature. The fixed prices in rigid contracts allow for trade only if the
good (i.e., low cost) state is realized. In the bad state the price never covers the
seller’s cost. Therefore, a mutually beneficial trade is infeasible and the trading
parties realize an outside option. Flexible contracts, in contrast, allow for trade in
the low and the high cost state because the buyer can always pick a high enough
price to cover the seller’s cost. If trade is possible, the buyer chooses the final
price. In rigid contracts the only price available is the fixed price; in flexible
contracts the buyer can choose any price in the price range, as long as the seller
gets at least as much as his outside option. The seller then observes the price
and chooses his performance. The seller can provide either normal quality or low
quality (shading). The provision of low quality is slightly more expensive to the
seller and substantially lowers the payoff of the buyer, that is, FHZ consider a
situation in which the seller has the possibility to engage in costly sabotage.
The results of the FHZ experiment are very supportive of the HM model.
In particular, the data confirm the empirical relevance of the trade-off between
contractual rigidity and flexibility on which much of HM’s analysis relies. In
response to the competitive pressure in the contract auctions, fixed prices in rigid
contracts and the lower bound of the price range in flexible contracts converge
to the competitive level over time. Although the competitive auction outcomes
imply that fixed prices in rigid contracts are low, sellers rarely engage in shading.
In fact, FHZ report that sellers provide normal quality in 94% of the cases. Thus,
although rigid contracts prevent trade from occurring in the bad state of nature,
3. For an extensive discussion of the specific design choices see FHZ.
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they are quite attractive to buyers in the good state of nature: Buyers pay low
prices and get normal quality in almost all cases.
Flexible contracts enable participants to trade in both states of nature. How-
ever, in the good state flexible contracts are less profitable for buyers than rigid
contracts. The problem is that in flexible contracts many sellers are willing to
provide normal quality only if the buyer picks a sufficiently high price. When
buyers decide to pay prices close to the competitive level, the frequency of
normal quality drops drastically (to 60%). Thus, although there is no signif-
icant difference in the auction outcomes for rigid and flexible contracts and
buyers could, in principle, pay the same prices as in rigid contracts, sellers’
shading behavior forces buyers to increase their prices above the lower bound
of the price range. However, the significant price increase in flexible contracts
relative to rigid contracts is insufficient to deter all sellers from shading. The
frequency of normal quality in the good state is substantially lower in flexible
contracts (75%) than in rigid contracts (94%). In addition, there is also a sub-
stantial amount of shading in flexible contracts when the bad state is realized.
Sellers provide normal quality in only 70% of the cases. This reduces the positive
impact of guaranteed trade and further diminishes the attractiveness of flexible
contracts.
FHZ show that the negative impact of shading outweighs the benefits of
guaranteed trade for buyers’ profits in flexible contracts. Overall, buyers’ profits
are significantly higher in rigid contracts than in flexible contracts.
These results support HM’s theory and suggest the following interpretation.
In rigid contracts prices are fixed and the seller knows exactly what to expect.
Because the contract allows for only one outcome, there is no conflict in entitle-
ments and shading is very rare. Flexible contracts, in contrast, lead to conflicting
entitlements: whereas buyers prefer to pay low prices, sellers hope for a high price.
If the buyer does not satisfy the seller’s expectation, the seller is disappointed and
may engage in shading. However, because FHZ consider only a situation in which
trading parties move from a competitive market into a bilateral setting, they can-
not isolate the role of the fundamental transformation. In order to apply the HM
model to different settings, it is important to know whether the impact of contrac-
tual reference points depends on how the contract terms are determined. This is
what we investigate in this paper.
3. Experimental Design and Procedures
In this section we present the experimental design. Our setup is identical to the
one of FHZ except that we rule out the impact of competition on prices. Thus, we
remove ex ante competition and therewith the fundamental transformation from
the setup.
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3.1. Market Features and Parameters
In each experimental session there is a market with 28 participants. Half
of the participants are in the role of buyers; the others are in the role of
sellers. In each of the 15 periods buyers and sellers interact in groups con-
sisting of two buyers and two sellers. To minimize reputational concerns,
these interaction groups are randomly reconstituted at the beginning of every
period.
In each period sellers and buyers can trade units of a product. Buyers can
purchase at most one unit, and sellers can sell up to two units of the prod-
uct per period. The buyer’s payoff is defined as the difference between his
valuation for the product v and the price p. The seller’s payoff is given by
the price p minus the production costs c. Whereas the buyer’s valuation for
the product is entirely determined by the seller’s quality choice q, the seller’s
production costs also depend on the state of nature s. There are two states:
a good state (s = g), in which production costs are low, and a bad state
(s = b), in which costs are high. The good state occurs with probability
0.8. Sellers can choose between normal quality (q = qn) and low quality
(q = ql). The provision of low quality reflects costly sabotage, so that c(ql, s) >
c(qn, s).
Table 1 summarizes the cost and value parameters of the experiment.
A seller who does not sell both his units in a period can realize an outside
option xS = 10 for each remaining unit. If a buyer is unable to purchase a product
in a period, he can also realize an outside option xB = 10.
3.2. Interaction of Buyers and Sellers Within a Period
The interaction between sellers and buyers in a period is divided into nine steps:
Step 1 (Random formation of interaction groups): At the beginning of every
period buyers and sellers are randomly matched in interaction groups consisting
of two buyers and two sellers.
Table 1. Experimental parameters.
State of nature Good [Prob(s = g) = 0.8] Bad [Prob(s = b) = 0.2]
Seller’s quality Normal (q = qn) Low (q = ql) Normal (q = qn) Low (q = ql)
Seller’s costs 20 25 80 85
Buyer’s valuation 140 100 140 100
Notes: The table summarizes the main parameters of the experiment. Buyers’ valuation for the product and sellers’
production costs are displayed for both states of nature and both quality levels available to the seller.
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Step 2 (Draw of the basis price): The computer sets a basis price for each
buyer separately. The basis prices can take on values between 35 and 75 and are
drawn out of the empirical distribution of auction outcomes in FHZ.4
Step 3 (Buyers’ contract choice): Before his contract choice, each buyer
observes his basis price in the current period. The role of the basis price depends
on the contract choice. In rigid contracts the basis price is equal to the fixed
price. In flexible contracts the basis price defines the lower bound of the price
range, while the upper bound is exogenously fixed at 140 (the buyers’ maximum
willingness to pay, see Table 1). The buyer then decides whether he wants to
implement a rigid contract or a flexible contract in this period.
Step 4 (Contract assignment to sellers): When both buyers in an interaction
group have chosen their contract types, the two contracts are randomly assigned
to the two sellers. Each seller has a chance of 50% to get each of the two contracts.
Step 5 (Determination of the state of nature): After contracts are assigned
to sellers a random device determines and reveals the state of nature for each
contract independently. Trade occurs only if the contract allows for a mutually
beneficial outcome. Because flexible contracts always allow for prices that cover
the seller’s cost, trade occurs in both states. In rigid contracts, in contrast, trade
can take place only in the good state. In the bad state the fixed price is lower than
the seller’s cost, such that a mutually beneficial transaction is not feasible.
Step 6 (Buyers’ price choice): Once the state has been revealed, the buyer
can choose the actual trading price. In a rigid contract there is no choice, because
the randomly determined basis price is also the fixed price. In a flexible contract,
however, the basis price determines only the lower bound of feasible prices and
the buyer can choose any price in the predetermined range as long as the seller is
not worse off than in his outside-option.5
Step 7 (Sellers’ quality choice): Sellers observe the price choice of their buyer
and then determine their quality, which can be normal or low.
Step 8 (Profit calculations): After the quality choice of sellers all decisions
have been made. Profits are calculated and the players receive information about
their own individual profit.
4. In FHZ the contract terms are determined in “clock-auctions.” The auctions start at a price of
35. This makes sure that the sellers cannot make losses even if they shade. Then the price increases
every half second by one unit. Each of the two sellers in an auction has an “accept” button. The first
seller who clicks the button gets the contract. In rigid contracts the auction outcome directly defines
the fixed price. In flexible contracts the auction outcome determines the lower bound. By using the
empirical distribution of auction outcomes in FHZ, we make sure that the contract terms do not differ
across treatments. This guarantees that any difference between our results and the results in FHZ is
driven by the difference in the way in which the contract terms are determined and not by differences
in the contract terms themselves.
5. In the good state the buyer can choose any price in the range. In the bad state he must pay at
least a price of 95 (the seller’s cost if he provides low quality plus the outside-option of 10).
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Step 9 (Market information for buyers): Subsequent to viewing the profit
screen buyers get some aggregated information about the market outcome. Specif-
ically, they are informed about profits of buyers in both contract types averaged
over all past periods and they learn how many buyers have chosen the rigid contract
and the flexible contract in the current period.6
The screen with the market information for buyers ends the period. After
this a new period begins and the participants are randomly reassigned to a new
interaction group.
3.3. Subjects, Payments, and Procedures
All subjects were students of the University of Zurich or the Swiss Federal Insti-
tute of Technology Zurich (ETH). Economists and psychologists were excluded
from the subject pool. We had 28 subjects (14 buyers and 14 sellers) in four of
our five sessions and (due to no-shows) 24 subjects (12 buyers and 12 sellers) in
the remaining session. This yields a total number of 136 participants in the exper-
iment. To make sure that subjects fully understood the experiment, each subject
had to read detailed instructions and correctly answer a set of control questions
before the session started.
The exchange rate between experimental currency units (“points”) and real
money was 15 points = 1 Swiss Franc. A session lasted approximately two hours
and subjects earned on average about 50 Swiss Francs (CHF 48 ∼ US$ 48, in
spring 2008).
The computerized experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner 2004).
4. Results
The key result in FHZ is that there is much less shading in rigid than in flexible
contracts. Therefore, flexible contracts yield lower profits for buyers than rigid
contracts although the latter rule out trade in the high cost state. Recall that the only
difference between our new treatment and the treatment of FHZ is that the con-
tract terms are exogenously given instead of competitively determined. In other
words, we eliminate the fundamental transformation. Therefore, the interesting
question is whether the removal of the fundamental transformation also removes
the difference in shading between flexible and rigid contracts. If that were the case
rigid contracts would lose their shading advantage and flexible contracts would
be unambiguously better than rigid contracts. Or put differently, we would have
6. We provide this information to enhance learning. For more detailed information see FHZ.
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Table 2. Seller’s quality choices across contract types.
Quality [s = g] Quality [s = b]
OLS Probit [ME] OLS Probit [ME]
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Price increment 0.004 0.004 0.014*** 0.023***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.007]
Flexible contract −0.012 −0.033
[0.032] [0.031]
Price inc. × Flex 0.003 0.006*
[0.003] [0.003]
Constant 0.653*** 0.685***
[0.069] [0.021]
Observation 827 827 150 150
R2 0.05 0.03
Notes: Price increment is defined as price minus 35 in columns 1 and 2 and as price minus 95 in columns 3 and
4. Flexible contract is an indicator variable which is unity if the contract is of the flexible type and zero otherwise.
Price inc. × Flex is the interaction of price increment and flexible contract. Columns 1 and 3 report coefficients of OLS
estimations. Columns 2 and 4 report marginal effects based on probit estimations. Because observations within sessions
may be dependent all reported standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the session level.
∗Significance at 10% level, ∗∗significance at 5% level, ∗∗∗significance at 1% level.
identified the fundamental transformation as the cause for the superiority of rigid
contracts in FHZ.
The main results of our experiment are summarized in Table 2 and Table 3.
Table 2 reports a regression analysis of sellers’ quality choices. Table 3 shows
averages of trading prices, quality choices, basis prices, and profits.
We first consider the outcomes of flexible contracts. As in FHZ, many sellers
are willing to provide normal quality only if the buyer picks a sufficiently high
price. This is evident from Table 2. In column 1 we investigate the good state
Table 3. Summary of outcomes in rigid and flexible contracts.
Contract type Rigid contract Flexible contract
State of Nature Good Bad Good Bad
Average Price 39.8 − 50.3 97.9
Rel. Freq. of Normal Quality 0.67 − 0.75 0.73
Average Lower Bound − 40.0
Average Profit Buyer 68.8 71.2
Average Profit Seller 16.21 26.9
Rel. Freq. of Contract 17.75 82.25
Notes: The table summarizes outcomes for rigid and flexible contracts in both states. All numbers are based on the data
of all five sessions. Average Price is the average of the trading price. Relative Frequency of Normal Quality measures the
percentage of cases in which the seller has chosen the normal quality. For rigid contracts this information is available only
for the good state, because trade does not occur in the bad state. Average Lower Bound is the average of the empirical
realizations of the basis price which provided the lower bounds of the price range in flexible contracts. Average Profit
Buyer (Seller) is the overall average payoff of buyers (sellers) for each contract type. Relative Frequency of Contract is
the share of the total number of contracts that corresponds to each contract type.
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of nature. We regress an indicator variable for choosing normal quality on price
increments, an indicator variable for flexible contracts, and the interaction term
of the two. We define price increments as the difference between the actual price
and the lowest possible price of 35.7 Summing the constant and the coefficient
for flexible contract reveals that sellers provide normal quality in only 64% of the
cases when the price is at its lowest level of 35. However, the same regression
also indicates that the sellers’ propensity to choose normal quality significantly
increases if the buyers pay higher prices in flexible contracts (F -test of price
increment + flex. contr. x price inc. = 0 yields p < 0.01).8 Column 3 investigates
the price dependence of quality in the bad state of nature. We regress the indi-
cator variable for choosing normal quality on price increments (now defined as
the difference between price and the lowest possible price of 95). The constant
indicates that the frequency of normal quality is only 0.69 when buyers pay the
lowest possible price. In addition, the significant coefficient confirms that there
is also a significantly positive impact of price on quality in the bad state.9
As a consequence of the price dependence of quality buyers are forced to
increase their prices and/or they suffer from shading. In the good state buyers
pay on average a price of 50, which is significantly higher than the average of the
empirical lower bound of 40, and the relative frequency of normal quality is 75%.
In the bad state buyers pay on average a price of 98 and sellers provide normal
quality in 73% of the cases (see Table 3).
Our findings for flexible contracts are almost identical to FHZ’s findings.
In fact, neither final prices10 nor relative frequencies of normal quality11 differ
significantly across treatments. Even the dependence of quality choices of sellers
on price offers by buyers in flexible contracts remains the same.12
In rigid contracts, however, the absence of ex ante competition in our treat-
ment leads to substantial differences relative to the findings in FHZ. Most notably
there is a dramatic drop in the relative frequency of normal quality. Whereas FHZ
report that sellers provide normal quality in 94% of the cases when the fixed price
is determined competitively, the relative frequency of normal quality drops to 67%
7. Using price increments instead of prices allows us to interpret the constant as the frequency with
which sellers provide normal quality when buyers offer a price of 35 in rigid contracts. The sum of
the constant and the coefficient of flexible contract reflects the frequency of normal quality at prices
of 35 in flexible contracts.
8. The probit estimation in column 2 confirms the findings of the linear probability model.
9. The probit estimation in column 4 confirms the findings of the linear probability model.
10. Final prices: 50.3 vs. 51.1 (FHZ) in the good state/97.9 vs. 98.4 (FHZ) in the bad state. Mann–
Whitney tests using session means as observations yield no significant difference.
11. Frequencies: 0.75 vs. 0.75 (FHZ) in the good state/0.73 vs. 0.70 (FHZ) in the bad state. Mann–
Whitney tests using session frequencies as observations yield no significant difference.
12. The coefficients identifying the price dependence of quality in flexible contracts in Table 2 are
not significantly different from the corresponding coefficients reported in FHZ.
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in our treatment (see Table 3). This difference is highly significant.13 Although
the fixed prices in rigid contract are identical across treatments by design, sellers
are significantly less likely to provide normal quality if the contract terms are
determined in a non-competitive manner.
The decrease in average quality has a significantly negative impact on buyers’
profits in rigid contracts.14 Although rigid contracts are significantly more prof-
itable (77.9) than flexible contracts (68.9) in FHZ, rigid contracts yield smaller
profits (68.8) than flexible contracts (71.2) in our experiment (see Table 2).15 In
response most buyers refrain from choosing rigid contracts.16
The comparison of our new results with the findings in FHZ confirms HM’s
conjecture that the presence of a fundamental transformation plays a significant
role for the impact of incomplete ex ante contracts on ex post trade. Based on their
data FHZ argue that the buyer can delegate the determination of the contract terms
to the market. Because sellers perceive the outcome of the competitive market
as a salient reference point, this allows the buyer to circumvent shading at very
low prices. In our new treatment the delegation of responsibility to the market is
not possible, because the terms are set in a non-competitive way. Accordingly,
the fixed price has no particular salience and the seller punishes the buyer for
the choice of the rigid contract with shading. Our evidence indicates that the role
a contract plays for a trading relationship depends not only on the content of
the contract but also on the competitiveness of the environment in which it was
concluded.
5. Conclusions
In a recent paper HM put forward a new theory based on the assumption that
ex ante contracts provide reference points for entitlements in ex post trade. They
demonstrate that this assumption has implications for organizational economics,
because it provides a new foundation for the employment relationship and for
authority. Because HM’s assumptions do not have a direct empirical basis, FHZ
test the main features of the model in a laboratory experiment. Their evidence
confirms the empirical relevance of the behavioral forces described by HM in the
presence of a fundamental transformation. However, because FHZ do not vary the
way in which ex ante contracts are concluded, they are not able to study necessary
13. Mann–Whitney test using relative frequencies of normal quality in rigid contracts per session
as observations: p < 0.01, one-sided.
14. Mann–Whitney test using mean buyer profits per session as observations: p = 0.02, one-sided.
15. The difference in buyer profits across contract types is not significant in our experiment
(Wilcoxon signed rank test using session differences in buyer profits as observations).
16. Whereas the share of rigid contracts increases from 38% to 55% over the span of the experiment
in FHZ, it decreases from 21% to 9% in our experiment.
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conditions for the relevance of contractual reference points. In order to apply the
HM model to different economic settings identifying such conditions is essential.
By showing that, in a laboratory setting, contracts no longer provide reference
points in the absence of a fundamental transformation, we take a first step in this
direction.
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